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Fair Work Australia is to provide the institutional framework for the Australian industrial relations 
system from January 2010. Its creation provides the opportunity to improve minimum labour 
standards’ enforcement in Australia. However, the experience of the past must be appreciated and 
traditional assumptions about the operation of the Australian enforcement system discarded if the 
new institution is to be effective in its role. This paper focuses on the role of unions in 
enforcement as well as institutional location issues to expose a number of central enforcement 
problems that those seeking to establish new systems and processes should consider. A number of 
recommendations in respect of the structure of Fair Work Australia and the continuing role of 
unions are suggested. 
 
An implicit assumption in the Australian industrial relations arena throughout the 20th century 
has been that checks and balances within the system were adequate to ensure minimum labour 
standards’ compliance, and that employer evasion of such obligations was rare. Recent 
research in the area of minimum labour standards enforcement in Australia provided the first 
insights into inspection in the federal jurisdiction (Goodwin 2003). Subsequent analysis of 
this data highlighted several issues related to compliance: employer award non-compliance 
was both significant and sustained for the period (Goodwin & Maconachie 2007); being a 
young or female worker, working in a female dominated industry or industry with a high 
proportion of females employees, working in precarious forms of employment, or working in 
industries with strong competitive pressures, increased the chance of being underpaid across a 
range of entitlements (Goodwin & Maconachie 2005); and voluntary compliance or 
rectification rather than prosecution policies provided little deterrence for non-compliant 
activities(Goodwin & Maconachie 2007). In addition, analysis provided insights into 
inspection and relationships between the agency and government: shifts in inspection strategy 
reduced the probability of breach detection (Maconachie & Goodwin 2006); different 
institutional locations/forms do not reduce Ministerial influence on inspectorate policies and 
strategies; and regulatory theory notions about the effects of government ideology on 
resourcing of agencies do not hold true for the enforcement of minimum labour standards in 
Australia (Goodwin & Maconachie 2008).    
This research provided a contradictory view to traditional perceptions of the system’s 
operations during a predominantly centralised industrial relations era and raised issues about 
enforcement in periods of ‘deregulation’. In the context of another phase of industrial 
relations reforms under the Rudd Labor government, primarily the creation of Fair Work 
Australia as the central institutional feature, how might this research assist our understanding 
of what is required for effective minimum labour standards’ enforcement? The focus of this 
paper is on two aspects of enforcement: the changing role of unions as enforcement agents, 
and the importance of where the enforcement agency is located and its relative level of 
independent action. After considering these aspects and the issues they raise for enforcement, 
the proposed reforms planned to begin operations under Fair Work Australia are explored, 
and recommendations made in respect of these two elements of enforcement.  
 
Union Enforcement Role 
In the Australian context the role historically ascribed to unions approximates that of the 
official regulatory agency. Although the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration system was 
established in 1904, a system for monitoring and enforcing awards and industrial agreements 
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was not instituted. Consequently, unions provided the only form of enforcement for the first 
30 years until the first inspectors were appointed in 1934 (Parliamentary Debates 1934:1200). 
The debates over the appointment of inspectors began in the 1920s, and during that period 
evidence tendered by the Principal Industrial Registrar to Attorney General Latham in 1928, 
showed that one union spent £38 per week on enforcing one award (Australian Archives 
1928a). The government subsequently decided against appointing ‘an army of inspectors’ 
(Australian Archives 1928b) to police all awards, adopting instead a dual system of 
enforcement and entrenching the union role. Early union involvement in enforcement allowed 
unions to develop minimum labour standard enforcement expertise to a greater extent than in 
OHS enforcement. Furthermore, the unions’ power to initiate prosecutions for noncompliance 
with awards and agreements exceeds their comparative health and safety role (with the 
exception of the mining industry in some states) (Quinlan & Bohle 2000). While unions 
initially provided the only enforcement within the federal jurisdiction, the creation of the 
inspectorate in 1952 did not change their role. In reality their role complemented that of the 
inspectorate, allowing it to concentrate its activities on the non-union sector and to use its 
limited resources to best effect.   
Despite the significance of the role played by unions in enforcement, the balance between 
unions and official agency roles is not static. It is dependent upon legislative provisions that 
allow for, inter alia, union right of entry to workplaces for inspection purposes, and a right to 
inspect employment records of both members and non-members. This aspect of unions’ role 
became more critical as the agency shifted from routine inspections to a complaints-based 
approach. This change in agency strategy coincided with the shifts to a decentralised IR 
system, creating more work for the agency. Unions were caught by the increased workload as 
well, reducing their ability to ‘pick up the slack’. Two specific matters affected unions’ ability 
to strengthen their crucial role: enterprise bargaining was more time and resource intensive 
than making multi-employer awards; and falls in union membership from changes to the 
structure of employment, the effects of the business cycle, social attitudes to unions and the 
effects of management practices (Bray et al 2005) limited the extent of their influence. 
Declining union membership is illustrated in Table 1 highlighting trends in union density 
between 1911 and 2006. 
Table 1 Union density in Australia 1911-2006 
Trade Union Density - Percentage 1911 to 2006
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Source: 1911-1996 ABS Cat. No. 6323.0 – from Peetz, D. (1998) Unions in a Contrary World, Cambridge 
University Press, p.26; 1997-2006 ABS Cat. No. 6310.0. 
 
Most recently, figures released by the ABS noted union membership among young workers 
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between 15 and 24 years of age falling from 36% in 1986 to 10% in 2007. Density rates for 
the next age bracket (25-34) also fell dramatically from 48% to 15%. Overall, private sector 
unionism has fallen to 13.7%, with the public sector membership of 41% creating an overall 
unionisation density within the workforce of 19% (Hannan 2008:1,6). Falls in union 
membership affect the complementary nature of their relationship with the enforcement 
agency. Rather than being able to monitor upwards of 50% of the workforce as in the past, 
declining union density results in unions having a greatly reduced role in enforcement. 
In conjunction with reduced membership levels, unions’ role was significantly affected by the 
imposition of further restrictions to their rights to access workplaces by the Work Choices 
amendments to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 in 2006. These amendments made it more 
difficult for officials to meet with union members, to discuss workplace issues with non-
members or to police workplace standards (Ellem 2007:22; Elton et al 2007: 64). A federal 
permit to enter workplaces, even for occupational health and safety reasons, is required, as is 
24 hours notice to the occupier of the premises. If requiring entry to investigate breaches of 
industrial instruments, the official must also serve an entry notice on the employer in a form 
approved by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, outlining the particulars of the 
suspected breach. If the breach is related to an Australian Workplace Agreement (AWA), a 
written request from the member to the union to investigate the breach must also be provided. 
Once on the premises, the official may inspect and make copies of records relevant to that 
suspected breach (Workplace Authority). Unions are hindered further by being allowed to 
access only the records of their members, rather than all employees at the workplace (Barnes 
2006:373). 
The legislative requirements to outline suspected breaches clearly identify workers who have 
instigated a complaint against them to employers, making them potential targets for 
retribution. Limitations on access to records outside of the advised alleged breaches require 
workers to know their entitlements, which research evidence has shown many do not 
(Australian Young Christian Workers 2001; Elton et al 2007). Being only able to monitor 
non-compliance and negotiate on behalf of their members rather than all workers at the 
workplace eligible to be members of the union has compromised the complementary roles of 
union and official enforcement agency. This, in addition to restrictions on unions’ right of 
entry and ability to access all records at a workplace means that non-union workers even in 
unionised workplaces risk falling through the ‘gap.’ 
The role of unions in enforcing compliance with the Act, awards and determinations has 
historically directly influenced the official enforcement agency in two positive ways, allowing 
concentration on non-unionised sector and better targeting limited resources. However, their 
role may allow governments to abrogate their responsibility in two ways:  by scaling back 
resources to the agency, and/or using union enforcement as a ‘convenient justification’ for 
any perceived inactivity of the official agency, especially in respect of complying with 
international inspection standards. International Labour Organisation Convention No. 81 of 
1947 (Labour Inspection) was ratified by Australia in 1975, however many aspects of 
Australian labour enforcement have had questionable compliance with the standards, and at 
times appear to have breached our obligations. One example relating to the union versus 
agency enforcement role was observed between the late 1970s and 1991.  Government reports 
to the ILO on labour inspection attached increased significance to union inspection powers to 
demonstrate Australia was meeting its obligations under Articles 16 and 18, because within 
the agency ‘neither staffing levels nor, as a consequence inspection frequency, were optimal’ 
(Australia 1981/83; 1983/85; 1989/91).  
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Institutional Location 
In the regulatory enforcement literature a distinction is made between independent regulatory 
agencies and those tied to the executive arm of government. Within the Australian context a 
number of agency types are discernible with reporting mechanisms and independence of 
actions the key differentiators:  
• Agency within a government department - operational procedures are directly aligned 
with broader departmental (and governmental) objectives and decision-making 
hierarchy (Tregillis 1988).  
• Agency attached to a government department - reports are made to the Departmental 
Secretary (or delegated officer), but the agency enjoys a high degree of independence 
with regard to the manner in which the agency achieves its objectives as established 
through Ministerial Directions.  
• Executive agency – created or abolished by the Governor-General (in Council) after 
recommendations from a portfolio department and Prime Ministerial approval, thus 
not requiring further legislation (Australia 2000).  Wettenhall (2003:11) has argued 
that they were created to fill a need for ‘a structural arrangement falling somewhere 
between a departmental division and that of a statutory authority, allowing a degree of 
operational independence and a separate organisational base for senior public officials 
with specialised cross-departmental functions.’ While not seen as warranting the 
degree of autonomy given to statutory authorities, executive agencies nevertheless had 
duties which did not come within the ordinary functions of departments (Australian 
Public Sector Commission 2007). A direct relationship exists between the minister and 
the head of the executive agency, with the Minister having a degree of direct control 
over the agency’s policies, strategies and decision-making. 
• Statutory authority - bodies or groups of persons established by legislation which sets 
out ‘the arrangements for the appointment and termination of the agency head and 
their specific powers, responsibilities and accountability requirements’ (APSC 2007). 
Importantly, the statute determines the extent of the autonomy provided to the 
authority and the limits of ministerial intervention in its affairs. Wettenhall (2005) 
describes a three-way relationship between parliament, government and statutory 
authorities, with part of parliament’s role to protect and support in situations where a 
statutory authority feels compelled to criticise or take a position different to the 
minister or departments.  
There is general agreement in the literature that an agency’s location within a government 
structure affects the degree of political control that can be exercised over it. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that the enforcement strategies of agencies tied to the executive arm of 
government are influenced by both the ‘internal pattern of power within government 
Ministries’ (where the hierarchical position of a particular Department affects ‘the degree of 
power and discretion’ it possesses within government), and by the agency executives’ 
relationship with private industry (Hutter & Manning 1990:110-11). Research has shown 
however, that in Australia both Labor and Coalition government have directly influenced the 
operation of the labour enforcement agency regardless of institutional location or apparent 
‘independence’ (Goodwin & Maconachie 2008). The direct influence is most noticeable in 
respect of the prosecution activities of the inspectorate. 
The following table (Table 2) aligns institutional location with period and government. It 
should be noted that while institutional location may be identical under different governments 
political pressures placed on the inspectorate may result in very different outcomes. 
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Table 2: Institutional location of enforcement inspectorate 
Period Institutional Location –title of agency Government(s) 
1954- 1977 Attached to department Menzies Coalition; Whitlam Labor 
1 March 1978 - 1983 Statutory authority – Industrial Relations Bureau Fraser Coalition  
1983 – 1985/86 Attached to department – Arbitration Inspectorate Hawke Labor 
1985/86 - 2006 Within department – Arbitration Inspectorate,  Award Management 
Branch, Office of Workplace Services 
Hawke  & Keating Labor; Howard 
Coalition 
March 2006 – June 2007 Executive agency – Office of  Workplace Services Howard Coalition 
1 July 2007- current Statutory authority – Workplace Ombudsman Howard Coalition; Rudd Labor 
 
The most significant effect of institutional location on the enforcement agency occurs when it 
is placed within a department. Here, the inspectorate’s enforcement role is often incompatible 
with other departmental functions and objectives, in particular, the department’s liaison and 
intelligence gathering role where close working relations with business, employer 
organisations and unions were paramount (Tregillis 1988; DIR/PSU 1993). In the past 
inspectors were very concerned by the different cultures within department and enforcement 
agency making comment such as ‘they just didn’t understand what our job was’ and were 
‘very uncomfortable with the idea of confronting employers’ (Goodwin 2003). 
As part of that incompatibility, reporting of agency activities becomes subsumed within 
departmental objectives. The demise of the independent annual report commenced with the 
1988/89 report, the first report to clearly depart from ILO Convention No.81 reporting 
requirements (ILO 1979). With the creation of the Awards Management Branch in 1990/91 
even limited ‘independent reporting’ ceased. Continuing the subsumption, the 1992/93 DIR 
Annual Report replaced the concepts of enforcement and compliance with the aim of 
improving the way federal awards and agreements work, including helping people comply. By 
1994/95 the remnants of enforcement work were so integrated into the normal routine of the 
department that it became almost impossible to differentiate it from the general service 
provided to government to advance their programs (DIR 1989-1995).  
Following the 2001 election the Howard government launched the Uhrig Review into 
statutory authorities to reform governance structures of these agencies. Of concern here are 
Uhrig’s recommendations that serve to dismantle the triangular relationship between 
parliament, government and statutory authorities. Wettenhall (2003:11) considers that: 
The inquiry was clearly driven by a desire to improve ministerial control with a 
‘governance’ paradigm that believed all delegations of power should be strictly 
delimited. Scant attention was given to the interests of the legislature. …parliament has 
a strong interest in how statutory authorities operate within the legislative contexts it has 
itself established, and that proper pursuit of that interest requires recognition that the 
relationship framework of statutory authorities is different to that of departments. 
By replacing the triangular relationship with a linear relationship, one outcome of the Uhrig 
Report was to enhance a Minister’s power to direct and control statutory authorities. This was 
acknowledged by Joe Hockey, then Minister for Human Services, in stating that the aim of 
abolishing Centrelink and the Health Insurance Commission boards was to bring those 
organisations ‘under strong ministerial control’ (Gourlay 2006:8). Criticisms of the Work 
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Choices amendments were addressed through changes establishing the Office of Workplace 
Services (OWS) as an Executive Agency (Australia 2006), with the Minister for Employment 
and Workplace Relations responsible. Although repeatedly described by both the responsible 
Minister and the OWS itself as an ‘independent agency’ (Andrews 2006), executive agency 
status only meant that the OWS became ‘independent’ from DEWR. Gourlay noted (2006:6) 
‘the OWS is subordinate to the minister. Indeed, as a separate agency whose head is now 
appointed by the minister, its functions are more susceptible to ministerial direction, and so 
less independent, than when it was within DEWR.’  
Despite these measures, allegations of employee exploitation increased significantly and the 
successful ACTU television advertising and protest campaign led to opinion polls suggesting 
that 55% of Australians opposed the amendments (ABC 2007). The government reacted to 
this political crisis by enacting the Workplace Relations Amendment (A Stronger Safety Net) 
Act 2007 which introduced a ‘fairness test’ to ensure fair compensation for employees when 
protected award conditions were modified or removed from agreements. The amendment also 
provided for the OWS executive agency to be transformed into a statutory authority, the 
Office of the Workplace Ombudsman (OWO) on 1 July 2007. 
Whilst ostensibly an independent agency, in the post-Uhrig Report environment the Minister 
has increased powers to direct and control the operations of such statutory authorities. This 
new relationship is emphasised by amendments to the Workplace Relations Regulations 
(2007) which allowed the OWO to disclose information in order to brief the Minister for 
various purposes, including providing information about a complaint or issue raised by the 
Minister or about proceedings initiated by a workplace inspector. This reversal of reporting 
standards, when compared to that of the OWS when part of DEWR, served the government’s 
immediate need to be seen to have addressed the negative effects of Work Choices. 
Independence of the enforcement agency is imperative, not only for compliance with 
international conventions and for the development of specialised expertise rather than generic 
skills, but also for the agency and inspectors to be able to critique both the system and the 
legislation underpinning enforcement and make recommendations for changes and 
improvements. Locating the enforcement agency within a department is problematic as it 
undermines the agency’s independence as well as potentially leading to direct conflicts 
between its functions and those of the broader department. 
 
Opportunities for Improvements in Enforcement  
With the election of the Rudd Labor government and planned reforms for the federal IR 
system, an opportunity exists to address and rectify challenges in the area of enforcement. 
Several aspects of the new government’s proposals have the potential to affect minimum 
labour standards’ enforcement, particularly the creation of a new institution Fair Work 
Australia from 2010 and the award modernisation process. These are briefly discussed below. 
 
Fair Work Australia: 
All current enforcement agencies and industrial relations institutions are to be relocated into 
Fair Work Australia (FWA). This incorporation of all enforcement agencies provides the 
opportunity for the government to reconsider resourcing issues (both personnel levels and 
budgetary arrangements). The OWS was provided with $97 million of additional funding over 
four years to deal with Work Choices-related matters while the Australian Building and 
Construction Commission (ABCC) was given over $100 million to enforce one industry. 
While acknowledging the political motivations of both of these funding decisions, if the 
enforcement agency is to be effective it must be adequately funded and staffed. Increased 
resourcing is necessary in the transition period of reforms to allow the agency to adapt to new 
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requirements and increased calls on their expertise from an anxious and uncertain workforce. 
It is also required to create a deterrent effect on employer non-compliance. 
Interestingly, recent research has identified a trend in many countries in both Latin America 
and Europe towards increasing the size of labour inspectorates in the last two decades, 
coinciding with increased free market activity. Piore and Schrank (2008:2-3) note the more 
than doubling in size of labour inspectorates in Chile, the Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala, while considerable increases have been undertaken in Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, Uruguay, France and Spain. 
 
Institutional location/structure of Fair Work Australia: 
Specialist units within FWA are planned to promote specific issues such as ‘family-friendly’ 
work practices or enforce individual sectors such as the building and construction and 
hospitality industries (Forsyth et al 2008:228-231). The Wilcox Inquiry is investigating the 
transition of the ABCC to the FWA, and how this may be achieved to best effect 
(www.workplace.gov.au). The structure of FWA is crucial not only to effective enforcement 
practices but also to the provision of the broad range of services. Issues have been raised 
above about the effects on the independence of the agency when encapsulated within an 
institution, but several specific matters may arise if the planned structure is adopted: 
• It seems an unnecessary expense and duplication of functions to have an agency 
concentrating its activities on enforcing the Act in one industry sector. At present the 
ABCC generally refers matters relating to breaches of minimum labour standards to 
the OWO, while the OWO can initiate investigations in the building and construction 
industry (Forsyth et al 2008). Thus dual investigations occur and reporting 
mechanisms between the two agencies are required. Such actions can lead to 
enforcement difficulties and inefficiencies. 
• The terms of reference for the Wilcox Inquiry assert the ABCC’s existence is to 
ensure all participants comply with workplace relations laws because the building and 
construction industry makes a ‘critical contribution to the Australian economy, 
employment and productivity’ (www.workplace.gov.au:1). This matter appears to 
disregard the ideological underpinnings of the ABCC, making any appraisal of its 
future operations, location or structure less valid. 
• When the enforcement agency is located within a department several issues have 
arisen in the past: subordination to the department’s overall agenda; lack of 
independence in reporting; and problems of culture clashes across sections of the 
department responsible for different functions. While the first two have been briefly 
considered earlier, the last point is critical if all agencies are to exist under the one 
‘umbrella’ organisation. Some sections of FWA will be focused on enhancing 
relations with employers and employer groups, providing advice and assistance, while 
the enforcement agency is focused on ensuring compliance with the Act and or 
industrial instruments, potentially resulting in prosecution. These two competing roles 
create tensions between divisions/areas because of the different cultures required for 
the roles.  
While recognising the hostility traditionally directed towards the Industrial Relations Bureau 
established by the Fraser government, the model underpinning the IRB could be useful for 
enforcement within FWA. Rather than having Specialist Divisions monitoring behaviour in 
one or two select industry sectors, the FWA Inspectorate could consist of two agencies: a 
labour inspectorate and an Act enforcement agency. This would allow enforcement according 
to ILO Convention 81 (Labour Inspection) and enable enforcement of the Act itself. Both 
should apply economy wide and allow the development of inspection strategies within the Act 
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enforcement agency similar to labour inspection, but dealing with unlawful activities and 
behaviours of employers, unions and workers. In exploring possible structures for FWA, 
Hancock (2007: 7-14) suggested three divisions (dealing with the safety net, oversight of 
associations and bargaining, and unfair dismissal) with an additional judicial division. The 
two labour inspectorate agencies (as discussed above) could be situated within such a judicial 
division.  
Thus the recommendations would be: 
1. Create both a labour enforcement/minimum standards’ agency and an Act 
enforcement agency within the FWA, each with clear and separate powers and 
functions; 
2. Ensure sufficient autonomy to the two enforcement agencies to develop and 
enforce broad inspection and prosecution strategies, in accordance with Australia’s 
international obligations and recognized regulatory principles; 
3. Ensure that if the labour enforcement/minimum standards’ inspection agency is 
within FWA it is able to report independently, and crucially raise issues of 
importance to its enforcement and prosecution responsibilities such as legislative 
deficiencies. 
 
Award Modernisation process: 
As part of the Labor government’s Forward with Fairness policy, the AIRC will be required 
to undertake an award modernisation process to make awards simple and easy to understand, 
reduce the regulatory burden on business, provide a fair minimum safety net of enforceable 
terms, be economically sustainable, and promote flexible work practices while promoting 
collective enterprise bargaining (O’Neill & Neilsen 2008:16).  
The OWO, drawing on past and current enforcement issues, has outlined a number of matters 
requiring consideration in the award modernisation process to assist it in its enforcement 
duties. These echo regulatory arguments and are appropriate as recommendations here.  They 
include: 
1. drafting of awards and award flexibility clauses in an unambiguous manner; 
2. employing plain language which leaves as little room for interpretation or dispute 
as possible, as well as ensuring employers and employees have timely, accurate 
and unambiguous information about their rights and obligations; 
3. prohibition on duress in the making of individual flexibility agreements in such a 
manner that such duress can be prosecuted as a breach of the award;  
4. a system for determining ‘genuine agreement’ in the creation of flexibility clauses; 
and  
5.      a system for ensuring the effective operation and enforcement of the ‘no 
disadvantage’ type test. (OWO 2008: 5-10).  
 
Unions: 
The reduced coverage of unions and their more limited ability to provide their traditional 
complementary role to the official enforcement agency has two possible outcomes: either 
unions play no role at all in enforcement or their role is strengthened to provide greater 
coverage within unionised workplaces. Regardless of the traditional role played by unions in 
enforcement the fact that Australian governments in the 21st century are probably no more 
enthusiastic (fiscally or politically) to create an ‘army of inspectors’ than their predecessors in 
the 1920s means that in reality unions must continue to play a role in enforcement. To regain 
the integrity of the system requires two changes in respect of unions: 
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1. they require adequate rights of entry to workplaces;  and  
2.     they require adequate authority to check all workers’ records not just union 
members. 
 
Conclusion 
The traditional role of unions in enforcement in Australia has allowed governments to be less 
active, provide fewer resources and to assume (like most in the IR field) that the system is 
operating without substantial problems. However, research has demonstrated that minimum 
labour standards enforcement even under a centralised wage-fixation system was not without 
problems. Shifts in inspection strategy from regular, comprehensive, targeted workplace 
inspections through ‘sampling’ approaches to complaints-based approaches have reduced the 
probability of employer non-compliance being detected by placing the onus on workers to not 
only know their entitlements, check records regularly but also make a complaint. Complainant 
confidentiality was lost in this process, forcing the employee to make choices about whether 
to complain and potentially face retribution such as termination, or to wait until other 
employment is sourced before making a complaint. Those with language difficulties or 
cultural differences where challenging authority is not encouraged are particularly 
disadvantaged by such strategies.  
Since the mid-1980s those problems have been compounded by decentralised enterprise 
bargaining, by increased individualism in the employment relationship, by decreased union 
density, by reduced union right of entry powers, by increasingly precarious types of 
employment, by a growing small business sector and by fewer protections in respect of 
employment termination. Each factor reduces the effectiveness of already stretched resources 
of the official enforcement agency, reduces the coverage and effectiveness of unions or 
reduces workers’ propensity to make complaints for fear of retribution. Each factor weakens 
the traditional complementary relationship between enforcement agency and trade union in 
the Australian IR system and increases the need for government intervention on either or both 
fronts. 
The creation of Fair Work Australia provides the opportunity to improve minimum labour 
standards’ enforcement in Australia. Of importance in overcoming past problems is the issue 
of agency independence. This must be addressed in the creation of Fair Work Australia, 
preferably through the creation of separate sections dealing with the enforcement of minimum 
labour standards and enforcement of the Act itself within a Judicial arm of the institution. Of 
equal importance is the issue of unions’ continuing role in enforcement. If their 
complementary role is to be maintained changes to union density need to be addressed – 
through increasing their powers to monitor and enforce standards for all workers at a 
workplace or by improving right of entry provisions. If this does not occur, the government 
will have to establish adequate resources to the enforcement agency within FWA to ensure 
proper compliance. However, the experiences of the past must be appreciated and traditional 
assumptions about the operation of the Australian enforcement system discarded if the new 
institution is to correct rather than compound existing problems. 
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